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This thesis analyzes the effects of a Naval Postgraduate School policy
decision made in FY 1997 that changed the fundamental unit of labor "currency"
or budgetary controls from work years to dollars in three departments at the
school: Systems Management, the Dudley Knox Library, and the Computer
Center. How this change in currency influences the dynamics of the School's
labor allocation model, labor execution, and other related issues, is the focus of
this study.
Interviews with the participants, a study of the labor allocation model and
analysis of labor execution data on the three departments were conducted. The
conclusions drawn from this data show that perceptions varied greatly about the
goals and implementation of the policy change among the participants. This
affected perceptions of success and failure of the policy change among the
participants. In addition, NPS relies on a labor allocation model that varies
substantially among these departments. The financial profile and workforce
composition (e.g. faculty versus staff) delineates characteristic differences
between . staff departments such as the Dudley Knox Library and Computer
Center, and an academic department, such as the Systems Management
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The 1997 Strategic Plan for the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey
called for increasing efficiency in operations at NPS. As part of that mandate, a
change in currency policy was initiated in three departments at the school: Systems
Management, the Dudley Knox Library, and the Computer Center. This was to be
accomplished by changing the fundamental unit of "currency" or budgetary controls
for labor from work years to dollars. The purpose of this change was to provide
department heads more financial flexibility in operating their respective
departments. This would then allow department heads to seek out efficiencies in
their respective departments (e.g., optimizing job classification) that would save real
dollars; savings could then be transformed in part into awards and incentives for
faculty and staff, as well as reinvested in department infrastructures. The policy
was implemented Schoolwide the following year. How this change in currency
influences the dynamics of the labor allocation model, labor execution, and other
related issues is the focus of this study.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions were analyzed and evaluated during this
thesis:
Primary: Did the change from workyear to dollar budgetary controls




Who were the participants in the initial currency policy change?
How does the labor allocation model work and how was it affected by
the policy change?
How are the incentives/disincentives for effective labor management
affected by the change in budgetary controls?
What goals did participants expect from the policy change?
Was there a difference in the perceptions of success between
superior and subordinate participants and between academic and
support departments?
What other changes related to labor management might better allow
the currency policy change to increase efficiency and generate
savings within the departments?
C. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research consists of four main parts. First,
standardized written surveys were given to personnel who participated in the labor
currency policy change. Second, the model formula and execution data related to
this transition were reviewed. Third, impacts of the change in the three test
departments were identified. Fourth, conclusions were drawn on how the change
influenced various stakeholders, incentives, and allocation methods.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis analyzes how the labor allocation model functions for both faculty
and staff. Data from the labor model will be analyzed in this context. Testimonial
data collected in survey responses will augment discussions on expectations,
incentives, and concerns about the change of currency policy.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters as follows:
Chapter II: BUDGET OVERVIEW
This chapter will provide background on the budget climate within which the
currency policy change was implemented.
Chapter III: LABOR ALLOCATION MODEL
This chapter will describe how the model works and analyze model
calculations.
Chapter IV: THE POLICY CHANGE
This chapter will analyze the support departments, Computer Services a.k.a.
Code 05, and the Library, as well as the academic department, Systems
Management or SM, that participated in the policy change to determine how they
were affected by the change.
Chapter V: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter will draw conclusions about the policy change as a whole, in
terms of stakeholder discussion, incentive discussion, and budget analysis.
F. SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis is to provide the reader with an overall picture as
to the change in policy, the participants, and the results. The final goal of the study
is to provide useful information on how the labor allocation methodology and




The School receives funds for use during the fiscal year through two media,
a direct operating budget/allotment and reimbursable orders/checks. FY 97
financial statements show an operating budget of $45,649,000 and reimbursable
orders/checks in the amount of $66,094,000 as seen in Figure 1. Fifty-three
percent of the total budget (operating plus reimbursable/checks) was spent on labor
($59,579,000). This is the FY 97 labor cost according to the FY 93-98 Certified
Budgets. FY 97 was the year the policy change was first implemented.
NPS Mission Funding Profile
Source: FY 93-98 Certified Budgets(X $1 000)
I Total Reimbursable
I Operating budget













Total Reimbursable includes Reimbursable Research (RR), Other
Reimbursables (RM), Tuition, and Tenant Funding
Figure 1. NPS Mission Funding Profile.
At the beginning of the fiscal year, the Comptroller allocates the operating
budget controls (Operations and Maintenance, Navy, or O&M, N) to the Academic
Planning office (AP) for the schoolhouse operations. The AP distributes controls
among the Deans, Chairs, and line managers and tracks execution throughout the
year. This thesis addresses labor planning and the FY 97 transition from workyear
to dollar allocations in the Academic area.
1. Fiscal Climate
Funding for the FY97 operating budget was a critical area of concern for the
School's upper management. The Superintendent at that time, Rear Admiral
Evans, addressed her concerns in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (N09B)
on January 7, 1997:
NPS arguments for funding all stem from an urgent need to maintain
the quality of its programs and academic infrastructure at a level
suitable to the advanced education of officers moving into the fast-
paced technical world of the coming decades. ...NPS survived the
budget cuts of the past several years by instituting a variety of internal
reductions and efficiencies while attempting to preserve the quality of
student education... In order to accommodate cuts... NPS has made
a number of adjustments. These include, for instance, elimination of
technology upgrades, cuts in faculty and support staff, a reduction in
funding of ship time for oceanography students, elimination of most
NPS elective courses, a termination of nonreimbursably funded
distance learning, and reductions in the Navy's civilian graduate
education program. In a phrase, NPS has zeroed its recapitalization
expenditures in order to support current teaching needs (albeit even
elective courses are being canceled); this is a plan for disaster.
NPS' difficult FY97 operating budget situation resulted in part from two
developments: Other Procurement, Navy (OP, N) funds were eliminated from the
School's budget, and the School absorbed larger than expected budget cuts during
6
the year. OP, N funds are marked for investment items. NPS had used OP, N
dollars to maintain and upgrade equipment and facilities, including technology in the
classrooms, laboratories, computing infrastructure, and other academic
infrastructure needs. From a relative peak in 1992, OP, N funding steadily
decreased until it was eliminated in 1996. With the loss of OP, N investment
funding, the School's dilemma was how to balance operational needs with
infrastructure requirements as shown in Figure 2.
OP,N & 0&M,N Funding
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Figure 2. OP,N & 0&M,N Funding.
In addition, NPS faced budget cuts during FY97. Historically, budgeted
controls are subject to in-year cuts imposed in the first quarter of the fiscal year by
Congress for the Navy reserves and for headquarters reserves. Reserves are held
back as contingency funds. NPS experienced larger than expected reductions in
FY 97 ($3,042,000) and FY 98 ($3,996,000) due to a specific congressional cut
targeted at professional development education (PDE) within DOD shown in Figure



































Figure 3. PDE and Reserves.
2. Budget Categories
Academic labor dollars have two main programmatic categories, direct and
reimbursable. Direct funding supports the schoolhouse programs and includes the
operating budget (O&M, N) for Navy and Marine students and tuition (reimbursable)
dollars for non-Navy students attending NPS.
The main programs supported by other reimbursable funds include the
reimbursable research programs, conferences/short courses, course/curriculum
development, distance learning and tenant activities, for example the Navy Center
for Acquisition and Training (NCAT), Defense Resources Management Institute
(DRMI), and Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR). Tenants are separate and
8
distinct from the schoolhouse labor issues discussed in this thesis. These tenants
have distinct budgets and personnel staffing that are not addressed by Academic
Planning. For the purposes of this thesis, these funds will not be addressed.
Reimbursable research (RR) funding is the largest reimbursable component
of academic labor planning as seen in Figure 4. Various faculty members negotiate
funded work with research sponsors. A faculty member develops a research
proposal for which a sponsor provides funds. Each proposal is treated as a
separate program and funding source according to DOD Financial Management
Regulations.





Figure 4. 1998 Mission Funding Profile.
Indirect support costs for General and Administrative (G&A) overhead are
assessed at 23% of RR direct labor as it is executed throughout the year. G&A
assessments provide indirect funds to the academic and support departments. A
final component of the plan is the other reimbursables category (RM). This category
9
can include conference fees, short courses, student thesis support, and interservice
support agreements (ISSAs).
10
THE LABOR ALLOCATION MODEL
A. THE LABOR PLAN
Academic Planning (AP) develops a labor plan to provide internal control and
tracking for academic labor. Some of the benefits added by having AP centrally
oversee academic labor budgets, include:
Understanding Navy budgeting (i.e., under executing budgeted
workyears and/or dollars can result in cuts to the budget)
Macro-planning (i.e., long range strategic planning with a schoolwide
versus departmental focus)
Flexibility for making mid-year corrections (i.e., Academic Planning
can adjust labor plans to accommodate in-year shortfalls and
execution cuts)
Minimizing detrimental impacts of fluctuations in an individual
department's reimbursable income (i.e., Academic Planning can cover
temporary shortfalls in reimbursable income, avoiding unnecessary
furloughs or reductions in force)
The AP uses a labor plan to initially allocate and then track execution
throughout the year. The labor plan is organized by department and separates
faculty and staff. Faculty and staff labor controls (workyears and dollars) are
allocated by using different formulas. The faculty model uses an empirical
performance-based allocation method based on class sections taught in prior years.
The staff model uses an incremental model based on historical staffing levels and
faculty-to-staff ratio standards. The change from workyears to dollar controls was
11
not a change in the allocation method. It changed only the unit being allocated.
B. WORKYEAR BASED LABOR PLANS
A workyear equates to the number of working hours in a given year (i.e., FY
1998 had 261 working days x 8 hours per day = 2,088 hours = 1 workyear). The
workyear is distinguished from end strength, which measures only the number of
personnel working at a particular time (i.e., a snapshot). Prior to FY 97, all
academic departments at NPS were issued workyear controls for their respective
budgets, and the labor dollars were tracked centrally by AP.
1 . The Faculty Workyear Allocation Model - Direct
The faculty workyear allocation model analyzes the number of qualifying
course sections taught within a department over the last four quarters. AP's criteria
for qualifying course sections at the time were:
A minimum number of students - at least 5 students enrolled per
section.
A minimum number of credit hours for a given course- lecture and lab
> two hours.
Taught by civilian faculty (military faculty are funded separately).
Qualifying course sections are then equalized to units of "equivalent hours
of instruction." The total hours of instruction delivered, plus a correction for
oversized classes (i.e., classes with more than twenty students), determines the
equivalent hours of instruction (EH). The correction equation shown in Equation 1





where N equals the number of students and H equals the number of credit hours.
As an example, the equivalent hours of instruction for a four-hour class of 30
students, is computed as follows in Equation 2:
EH = 4* 1+ 30^20 Q
20 J
The equivalent hours of instruction would equal 6 credit hours. Completed
theses are considered the academic equivalent of a two-hour course. The model
uses this historical data to calculate a department's pro rata share of direct teach
(DT) budget.
2. The Staff Labor Allocation Model - Direct
Staff controls are allocated based primarily on historical staffing data.
Academic departments, which have faculty and staff, e.g., the Physics department,
will measure staff levels against the faculty-to-staff ratio. Other support
departments, such as the Library and Computer Center, are fully manned with staff
personnel plus one or two faculty members as Directors and Deans. According to
AP, staff allocation for support departments is based on historical staffing levels,
with very few variances from preceding years.
3. Faculty and Staff Labor Allocation - Reimbursable
AP's estimate of reimbursable labor controls is based upon historical data
from previous years' reimbursable income. These controls estimate expected
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annual reimbursable labor income for the department. The academic departments
must generate this income throughout the year by soliciting sponsorship for their
specific research proposals, similar to a private business model.
C. WORKYEAR VERSUS DOLLAR BUDGET CONTROLS
Changing the control from workyears to dollars gives program managers
access to all the dollars associated with their program. This allows them the
flexibility to determine labor versus non-labor tradeoffs. Program decisions can be
made at the program manager level. The NPS Provost described his motivation for
the policy change as follows:
I became a participant because of the frustrations with multiple
controls and constraints put on Navy managers who are trying to
deliver a program and live within a volatile budget. I expected
managers to be able to better manage their programs, and managers
to feel better about their jobs. And, I wanted to move dollars from
labor to 'things'.
The Library shared this perception, as relayed by Layne Huseth, reader
services librarian:
A further incentive was that dollars in the labor budget that were not
spent on labor could be moved into OPTAR and spent on resources.
In the Library, our OPTAR budget has declined at a time when the
cost of resources (periodicals, serials, books and electronic tools like
CD-ROM's and Internet access to databases) has increased at rates,
which range from 1 1% to almost 20% per year. Because we obtained
the authority to manage our labor budget in 1997, we were able to
transfer $100,000 of excess labor dollars from the labor budget to the
OPTAR. Those funds made up for the shortage in the budget and we
did not have to cut subscriptions or significantly reduce funds spent
on books and electronic resources.
Management felt that this delegation of authority would make for better
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decisions at the department level and ensure the preservation of the core mission.
Furthermore, long term planning in the departments should allow them to better
position themselves for the future. The Library anticipates even greater success in
the future. According to Layne Huseth:
I anticipate even more success in these processes in the future. The
successes are tied to the library's process of strategically planning
actions - including those that involve staffing. There must be a link
between the planning process and management to budget, as well as
a commitment and involvement of the library management staff to this
process. We are developing strong links for all of these.
Changing the control unit from workyears to dollars did not change the
allocation model; workyear controls were simply converted to dollar controls for the
participating departments. However, the conversion to dollar controls did raise
some points worth noting. In the faculty labor allocation, AP uses average salary
to calculate the dollar allocation for a particular academic department. Once the
previous year's workload for the department is analyzed (e.g. class sections taught),
the AP determines the number of faculty necessary for the upcoming budget year
and multiplies that by the department's average faculty salary. Under workyear
controls, dollars are independent of the workyears. Now dollars and workyears are
interdependent at the department level.
The use of historical average salary to determine faculty dollar allocation
introduces an element of uncertainty. Historical data may not be the best standard
to use if better information is available. Labor plans are established in the June/July
timeframe of the prior year, but class scheduling and faculty planning also take
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place well in advance. Deans and Department Chairs are already determining
which classes are to be taught and by whom.
The fact that a lower paid Adjunct Professor was teaching a class in one year
does not mean that the next year's class scheduling will follow suit. The average
salary for faculty actually teaching classes may be different than the average AP
uses in their control calculations. In part this reflects the variability of RR funding.
Not only is the amount of the department's RR variable over time, there is also
variability in the time of year that specific professors are covered by RR. This
variability affects the average faculty salary for direct teaching (DT). Average staff
salary levels are more predictable, which gives Code 05 and the Library an
advantage over SM.
However, AP notes that some departments feel that this creates an incentive
to manipulate teaching plans (i.e., proposing to use high cost faculty in the planning
phase to receive higher dollar controls, then using lower cost faculty to teach and
generate savings). See Appendix C. Under the workyear model, the departments
were less aware of the cost of choosing one professor over another to teach a
class. By changing to dollars, managers have to weigh the choice of putting higher
paid faculty in the classrooms to meet the need of scheduled classes. Under dollar
controls, some managers complain about the incentive to place lower priced faculty
in classrooms. However, AP labor plans reflect that this has not occurred within SM
over the past three years (FY96, prior to the change, FY 97 and FY 98). The direct
teaching average faculty salary is consistently higher than the reimbursable average
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faculty salary for all three years. Furthermore, there is no perceptible trend in the
direct teaching average faculty salary as a percent of total average salary over this
period as seen in Figure 5.
Percentage of DT
Direct Average Reimbursable Average to RR Average Cost
FY96 $101,767 $98,976 1.028%
FY97 $105,796 $104,325 1.014%
FY98 $110,959 $106,784 1.039%
Figure 5. SM Average Faculty Labor Cost Data.
The use of historical data for either workyears or dollars has an impact on
future years. If a department consolidates classes and executes under control one
year for faculty, the next year it will receive a smaller allocation due to its labor
savings in the previous year. The previous year's "reward" dollars become a trade
off for reduced labor controls. Labor savings in previous years are translated into
penalties in future years.
Another policy change was implemented in FY 1997 that ran concurrent to
the "currency" policy change. This was the delegation of civilian personnel
classification authority to Systems Management and the Library. This policy
decentralized authority to determine the appropriate title, series, and/or grade pay
level of a department's staff. Previously the Human Resources Office (HRO) made
these determinations for the departments. According to Mary Aguilar, HRO
Director:
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Delegation of classification was implemented in FY97 with SM and
the Library, which both had Manage To Payroll (MTP) budget
authority.... Both Maxine (Reneker, Library Director), and Reuben
(Harris, SM Department Chair), were given authority up through GS-
13 (civilian pay rate).
However, in both cases AP has final authority to approve or reject job classification
changes. This had an impact on the departments' ability to utilize this policy
change.
In effect, the currency policy change and the delegation of job classification
authority were tied together. This became apparent as stakeholders expressed
their opinions about perceived disincentives associated with the currency policy
change.
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS
There are inherent differences concerning the two allocation models for
faculty and staff as they relate to support (Code 05 and Library) and academic (SM)
departments. Indirect funding budget estimates are a fraction of the estimated
reimbursable dollars, where estimates are provided by the Research Administration
Department, based on historical data. Indirect support costs pay for General and
Administrative (G&A) overhead. This is assessed at 23% of RR direct labor as it is
executed throughout the year.
Similarly, the support functions' indirect control is based on historical data.
However, the indirect received by staff support activities is a fraction of the
schoolwide reimbursable income, vice reimbursable income for a single department.
Other reimbursable funding in the support department labor plans commonly reflect
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support provided reimbursably by other parties (e.g., an Inter-Service Support
Agreement (ISSA) with a tenant for computer time on the NPS mainframe
computer). ISSAs are contractual arrangements between two parties for services.
These are established prior to the fiscal year and total payments or payment rates
are explicitly contracted.
1. Indirect Funds
As labor is executed biweekly, actual indirect cost recovery is based on
Reimbursable Research (RR) labor execution. The Computer Center (Code 05)
and Library receive 13% and 10%, respectively, of the School's total indirect (G &
A) recovery. The indirect report of September 16, 1997 indicated $238,823.55 in
indirect funding for Code 05 and $1 83,71 0.44 in indirect funding for the Library; the
School's total indirect recovery was $1,837,103.34. The academic departments
(including SM) receive 26% of the total indirect costs recovered under their
reimbursable research programs. For example, in SM, indirect costs distributed to
the Department were $85,298.80 in FY 97; however the reimbursable research
program in the SM Department generated a total of $328,072.22 in indirect cost
recovery.
According to Danielle Kuska, Director of Research Administration [Ref. 1],
the availability of indirect cost recovery returned to the academic departments is
more variable than that returned to the support functions. The distribution to the
academic departments is in direct proportion to the size of their reimbursable
research programs; the support functions, however, receive a fixed percentage of
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the School's entire indirect recovery. The overall RR labor executed over the years
is fairly constant and has increased from year to year. This makes the indirect cost
"income" relatively stable for support departments, such as the Library and
Computer Center. The instability of indirect recovery in the Academic departments
is indicated by the sponsored funding profile of the Physics Department. The
Physics Department's research labor is one example as seen in Figure 6.
NPS Total RR Labor vs Department RR Labor
($000)
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Figure 6. NPS Total RR Labor vs. Department RR Labor.
The amount of sponsored reimbursable research labor has been decreasing since
FY 1993. In FY 98 several Physics Department faculty members who were heavily
involved in reimbursable research left NPS, thus reducing the department's
reimbursable research by more than half (FY 97 research was $987K whereas FY
20
98 was $456K), and its indirect funding as a consequence. In this case, Physics
Department labor planning was detrimentally affected. Another example is found
in the Department of Systems Management. In FY 1996, SM's executed RR labor
was lower than the previous year's; therefore, its indirect staff support income was
also lower than expected.
2. Reimbursable - ISSA versus Research
Other reimbursable funds used for the Library and Computer Center labor
are generated mainly by ISSAs with other agencies that utilize their facilities. These
reimbursables are contractual agreements with established rates agreed by both the
provider and consumers of the service; they are renewed year to year. For
example, the Computer Center has maintained an ISSA with Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC) since 1994 for using the Center's mainframe computer.
To summarize, the academic departments' RR income is generated by
numerous faculty research projects. There are over 350 individual research
accounts listed in the Research Administration report for FY 1997. The number of
RR accounts per academic department ranged from four to forty-six. SM had thirty-
nine different research accounts. In contrast, the Computer Center has two main
accounts, indirect funding from school wide RR projects and the continuing DMDC
ISSA. Thus, support departments have more stable reimbursable funding sources
than the academic departments.
3. Year-to-Year Adjustments in the Labor Allocation Model
The different methodologies used to adjust labor allocations between the
21
academic and support departments highlight another significant difference. If the
academic departments execute under the labor control one year, by consolidating
classes or from lower student enrollment, they will receive a smaller labor allocation
the next year using AP's labor allocation methodology. One year's savings become
a short-term trade-off with reduced future labor controls. Labor savings in previous
years are translated into labor budget cuts, and, potentially, penalties in future
years.
The support departments' staff allocation is not adjusted year to year on the
basis of a formalized prior year workload measure or under execution. The
historical data utilized for prorating support department staff dollars is adjusted over
several years after a trend has been established. This shows a disparity between
the two models for Academic and support departments. The combination of these
issues highlights the differences between the two types of departments in the FY
1997 conversion of the workyears to dollar budget controls.
22
IV. THE POLICY CHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
The labor allocation model provides the framework by which the departments
may be analyzed. One year's labor data under the new allocation process limits the
ability to provide any detailed analysis of the effects of the change. Figure 7 shows
actual performance in the participating departments relative to their budgets in
FY97. Quantitatively, Code 05 and the Library generated over $100,000 in labor
savings each. SM faculty and staff overspent by $50,892 and $17,374,
respectively.
FY 1997 Labor Execution Results
(Dollars)
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Figure 7. FY 1997 Labor Execution Results.
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However, the numbers alone do not tell the whole story. Examining the
departments as two basic categories, support and academic, allows us to analyze
the apparent success of the support departments (Library and Computer Center),
as well as understand the perceived failure of the academic department (SM).
These departments are fundamentally different in nature, making real comparisons
difficult. Only by comparing the labor allocation model for the support and academic
departments can inferences be drawn concerning the currency policy change. This
will be discussed in terms of budget, stakeholder, and incentive/disincentive
analysis.
B. THE SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS - CODE 05 AND THE LIBRARY
Code 05 and the Library are treated similarly in the labor allocation model.
These support departments have little to no faculty (i.e., most of their employees
are staff). Labor allocation for staff in support departments is relatively simple and
very stable. These departments do not rely on internally generated reimbursable
research, and annual adjustments in the labor allocation model reflect long term
trends rather than the prior year's experience. The "luxury" of not having to deal
with disruptive annual adjustments in the labor allocation model and fluctuating
funding provided the support departments a more stable planning environment.
The reimbursable funding resources that the support departments do receive are
Indirect/ISSA (Inter service Support Agreement) funds, a far more stable funding
profile than the academic departments.
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C. THE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT - SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT (SM)
The SM department is a far more complicated entity in terms of labor
allocation than Code 05 and the Library. The Systems Management department
includes faculty and staff. Faculty funding represents the truly complicated and
variable part of the labor allocation model and results from two factors: 1) the labor
allocation for direct teaching reflects the prior year's experience rather than long
term trends and 2) academic departments rely heavily on internally generated
reimbursable research funding. 33% of SM faculty labor for FY 97 is reimbursable
research. The reimbursable research funding profile is variable in nature and thus
far more difficult to plan for and execute. Despite the fundamental differences in the
departments, the "stakes" of the departments have many similarities. The "stakes"
and the respective department "stakeholders" that participated in the currency policy
change are described in the next section.
D. STAKEHOLDERS AND STAKES
What and who are the stakeholders and what are the stakes in the currency
policy change? Stakeholders are those groups, parties, and claimants in an
organization that exert a force or hold on the organization [Ref. 2]. Using the formal
NPS organizational chart, the stakeholders in the currency policy change are
highlighted in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. NPS Organizational Chart.
The stakeholders include the Superintendent, Provost, Academic Planning,
Systems Management (SM), Code 05, and the Library. Observe the hierarchy of
the stakeholders on this chart. Compare this chart with a chart showing the
financial hierarchy of the stakeholders in the currency policy change in Figure 9.
Note how the financial relationship amongst the stakeholders is different than in the












Computer & Info Svcs
Code 05
Systems Management
Figure 9. NPS Financial Hierarchy
In the organization chart in Figure 8, the support and academic departments
are not directly subordinate to Academic Planning. SM is subordinate to its Dean,
however, which has ramifications for delegation of job classification, as discussed
later in this chapter. Figure 8 indicates that the support and academic departments
are directly subordinate to AP for financial purposes. This power relationship
became very important in executing the currency policy change.
The policy change involved different stakes for different stakeholders. The
delegation of labor authority provided more flexibility and decision authority for the
subordinate stakeholders; it offered the opportunity to improve the institution's cost
effectiveness, an extremely important and ongoing concern for the "power"
stakeholders; the Superintendent, Provost, and Academic Planning.
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E. GOALS OF THE CURRENCY POLICY CHANGE
Via a standardized written survey, the superior and subordinate stakeholders
were able to voice their perceptions and opinions concerning the goals of the
currency policy change. As the "power" stakeholders initiated the change in
currency policy, we shall begin by discussing their perceptions. Professor Dick
Elster, Provost of NPS, had this to say about the currency policy change goals:
Goals were to decentralize, and let managers manage. The goals
were no more defined than that. [Appendix A]
With the Provost's broad interpretation, the goals became more specific as
the policy worked its way down through the chain of command toward
implementation. Professor Dave Whipple, Associate Provost for Innovation, helped
originate and promote the currency policy change. Professor Whipple was also the
Systems Management department chairman prior to Professor Harris. He
envisioned the change in this way:
The goal was to see if there could be sufficient incentives provided to
at least slow the growth of DT (Direct Teach), if not to actually
'save/reduce' the department DT budget. One piece was to have
been that if a department could save (i.e. not allocate) some
percentage of its budget, savings could be shared 50-50, an even
split over some period of time. That is to say Academic Planning
would not take all of the savings achieved by the departments. Nor
would the departments' budgets be reduced the following year by the
full saved amount. [Appendix B]
Professor Gil Howard, Director of Academic Planning (AP) defined it this way:
The goal was to provide incentives to departments to save labor
funds. This was clearly understood by the Deans and was soon
evident to the departments. [Appendix C]
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When the subordinate stakeholders were asked about the goals of the policy
change, their answers were somewhat different. We begin with the response of
Professor Reuben Harris, Department Chair of Systems Management:
The goals were never clearly articulated to me. Maybe they were
clearly stated within the NPS Planning Board or elsewhere, but they
were not communicated to the other departments or me. [Appendix
D]
Layne Huseth, Reader Services Librarian, had this to say about the goals of
the policy change: "Goals of the experiment were not clearly defined.' [Appendix
E]
Finally, Professor Dave Norman, Code 05 Department Chair, had this brief
response to whether the goals of the policy change were clearly defined: "Never to
me." [Appendix F]
It is clear that the currency policy change suffered at the outset from a
communication problem in making the strategic plan a tactical reality. For purposes
of this discussion, strategy will be defined by what is to be done, whereas tactics are
how to implement the strategy. The next section will discuss incentives and
disincentives of the currency policy change, as perceived by the stakeholders, and
how these perceptions helped to shape their thinking as to whether the policy
change was an overall success or failure.
F. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
Academic Planning has always felt that every manager should take the
"good citizen" approach to managing. However, even the "good citizen" requires a
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certain amount of motivation. Incentives are one way of providing this motivation.
At a minimum, incentives should not work against the "good citizen."
A small "trial" group should be used to judge the relative merits of the
incentive plan rather than testing a new incentive program on a whole organization.
Gaining acceptance by the entire organization may be easier if it is perceived as
successful within the trial group. A trial group also provides experience in applying
the incentive program, making the transition to the final implementation easier if the
plan is deemed successful.
Theoretically, management should predict how the incentive plan would
affect the trial group. In this way, the plan may be monitored against predetermined
performance standards. Deviations from these standards may then be analyzed to
determine why they occurred and how they may affect the organization should the
plan be fully implemented.
Clearly, the preliminary trial must be successful, or at least indicate the
possibility for success, before the plan is implemented throughout the organization.
If the results are ambiguous or unsuccessful, the chances for the incentive plan to
work for the entire organization are marginal at best.
If it is considered successful, the plan should be briefed thoroughly to the
remaining elements of the organization prior to its implementation. The trial group
or groups should provide feedback as necessary until the new incentive plan is
thoroughly entrenched in all aspects of operations.
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If the above steps are taken, management should expect favorable results,
assuming they have set proper or clear objectives. A 1% increase in efficiency may
be a waste of time, whereas a ten percent gain may be worthwhile. The same may
be true of dollar savings. Management needs to identify the overall goal of the
incentive program and make this goal clear to the organization. [Ref. 3]
In this case incentives are implicit within the currency policy change; there
was no deliberate incentive plan established by Academic Planning. Though AP
downplayed the role of incentives, there was the perception of incentives within the
policy change among the subordinate stakeholders. When asked about perceived
incentives, Professor Harris of Systems Management stated:
To my knowledge there were no incentives offered other than the
implied freedom and the expectation that I would get to keep my
"savings" to be reinvested in SM. [Appendix D]
Layne Huseth, Reader Services Librarian, stated:
Incentives were more latitude in determining our staffing needs - we
theoretically were not constrained by the "Billet List". A further
incentive was that dollars in the labor budget that were not spent on
labor could be moved into OPTAR (This term stands for "Operating
Target" which is the department's non-labor allocation to spend on
purchases) and spent on resources. [Appendix E]
Professor Dave Norman, Code 05 Chair, stated:
The incentives were that we could recapture OPTAR by making better
use of billets. [Appendix F]
Note the commonality of the responses concerning perceived incentive
among the subordinate stakeholders. The answers were virtually identical. Among
the subordinate stakeholders there was no confusion about incentives within the
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currency policy change. The question must then be asked: Were their perceptions
of the inherent incentives in line with those of the superior stakeholders?
Dick Elster, NPS Provost:
The incentives for managers stemmed from the desire to do a good
job, and to have authority commensurate to their responsibility.
Managers could, for instance, "convert" labor dollars to 'things'.
[Appendix A]
Professor Gil Howard, Academic Planning:
The incentive was that, unless the budget was cut, the departments
would be able to keep any faculty labor savings for other uses.
[Appendix C]
Unlike the perceived goals of the currency policy change, there was little
difference of opinion between the superior and subordinate stakeholders concerning
the perceived incentives. This clarity of perception highlights a key area where the
change of currency from workyears to dollars had an impact. However, clear
incentives combined with unclear goals can lead to conflict. In this case conflict
arose through disincentives generated in attempting to execute the currency policy
change.
When asked about the disincentives that arose in attempting to execute the
policy change, Reuben Harris related this:
The disincentives turned out to be much more prevalent-frustration
resulting from having no freedom to act and having all PD (Position
Description) revisions denied by 01 (Provost) or 01 1 (AP). [Appendix
D]
Layne Huseth, on the other hand, said:
The only disadvantage I can think of is the difficulty in getting things
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through the Academic Planning Office. [Appendix E]
Professor Norman, of Code 05, did not state that there were in fact any
disincentives as a result of executing the currency policy change. [Appendix F]
Notice the variation of responses concerning disincentives. Systems
Management felt the most strongly that there were serious disincentives; the Library
and Code 05 felt they were minimal to nonexistent! The main disincentives
perceived by the SM and the Library were in regard to implementing their new
delegation of job classification authority. Since Code 05 was not a participant in the
delegation of job classification authority experiment, it did not experience this
frustration. The HRO Director stated:
Unfortunately, we did not change the personnel approval process to
facilitate MTP (manage to payroll). When either SM or the Library
made a (job) classification decision, it was still subject to approval by
Academic Planning. Actions were put on hold in Academic Planning
and I received numerous calls from both departments about their
frustration in being able to carry out the authority that they had been
delegated... The first year they classified very few positions.
Reuben's (SM) authority was actually pulled after the first year
because the decision was made to give class authority to the deans
and not below that level. The Library has classified numerous
positions in year two.
The superior stakeholders saw the disincentives differently. This is not
surprising because they take a "macro" view of the institution as a whole.
From Professor Elster, Provost:
Disincentives (frustration and anger) developed as unfulfilled resource
expectation at the School level forced me to cut the dollars I had
promised managers they would have. [Appendix A]
Professor Howard, Academic Planning, stated:
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...any shortfalls would have to be made up from other sources (staff
labor or OPTAR). This change to dollars was also put in effect for
staff labor. [Appendix C]
Finally, Professor Dave Whipple stated:
As I understand the way it was implemented, there was never a
mutual agreement on "the baseline" or a full resourcing to provide the
intended incentives [Appendix B]
The superior stakeholders indicated that they felt that a big disincentive to the
subordinate stakeholders was budget cuts across the board. As mentioned in
Chapter II, the school absorbed a $3,042,000 budget cut in FY97. However, AP
had anticipated the budget cut and set aside a reserve amount prior to the
department labor allocations. The remainder was absorbed outside the school's
labor budget. These adjustments precluded the need to cut the faculty and staff
labor budgets. This may explain why the subordinate stakeholders did not mention
across the board cuts as a disincentive.
Disincentives, specifically as they related to the academic department, arose
more due to the policy change process itself, a process within the control of NPS.
It is here that the major concern about perceived disincentives of the currency
policy change lay.
G. THE LABOR PLAN FOR EXECUTION TRACKING
Another important use of the Labor Plan is execution tracking.
Decentralizing labor dollar controls heightens the importance of accuracy within the
departments (e.g. a 1% variance in labor calculation for a $59,579,000 labor budget
is $595,790 dollars). Workyears are budget controls/ targets that are not regulated
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by law. Dollars are governed by appropriation law for use, purpose, and amount
(e.g. 31 U.S. Code 1517, 1310, and 1512). Therefore, if the School over executes
a workyear control, this is not good budgeting. However, if it over executes dollars,
it has broken the law. Under the workyear model, labor dollars were centrally
managed by AP in close coordination with the Comptroller's Office. Furthermore,
AP calculates labor costs differently than the official accounting system. If
budgetary oversight and control is decentralized to the division Deans or
departments under the dollar control model, it becomes increasingly hard to resolve
budgetary discrepancies between AP's labor plan and the official accounting
system.
More specifically, workyear calculations are easier to monitor than dollar
calculations due to the effect of leave and fringe benefits. The workyear
calculation is: PH + LH/D x 8. PH is the number of productive/working hours
executed, LH is the number of paid leave hours taken, D represents the number
of working days in that fiscal year and 8 is the number of hours in the normal
workday.
The calculation for labor costs involves accrual accounting and statistical
accounts for leave and fringe costs. This complicates the formula for calculating
direct costs. AP's formula for calculating direct labor cost is different from the
official accounting system. According to Anne Hankins, NPS Budget Analyst,
statistical accounts for leave and fringe are established to recoup the reimbursable
labor's share of these costs because leave and fringe costs always charge against
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the direct operating budget [Ref. 4]. Whenever a reimbursable hour of work is
charged, an additional charge is levied for the statistical accounts. This offsets the
cost against the direct operating budget. The direct operating budget provides the
buffer for the actual leave and fringe costs compared to the statistical rate. The
AP's formula for calculating direct cost is different from the official accounting
system.
One example of this issue surfaced in FY98. President Clinton officially
declared an extra federal holiday the day after Christmas. The statistical leave
account did not include this holiday in its rate calculation. Therefore, this was an
unexpected cost against the direct labor account. AP's labor tracking would have
understated the direct labor cost and thus giving the departments inaccurate
information regarding labor costs. This issue causes problems when departments'
expected labor cost savings fail to materialize due to variances in NPS's true labor
cost. [Appendix G] This can be a critical component for the program's incentives
structure, as discussed in Chapter IV.
H. FY97/98 BUDGETARY DATA
Budgetary results for the three test departments are shown in Appendix
H. The chart shows control versus executed dollars. The Library had labor
savings of $100,522 in FY97 and $239,381 in FY98. According to Layne
Huseth:
The library had excess labor dollars due to the difficulty we
experienced in filling a number of unexpected vacancies. Several of
these were advertised nationally (in American Libraries). It took a
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long time to obtain a pool of qualified applicants, to schedule
interviews and then select employees to fill those positions....We
were able to create several new positions, classify them, and recruit
applicants that met our changing work needs. In addition, we were
able to salvage $100,000 of our labor budget for resources purchases
that would otherwise been lost We are now looking into hiring
librarian interns; the creation of career ladder positions within the
library in several different series; intermittent status; and several other
options which would give us some flexibility in managing our
payroll...We have realized efficiencies and savings through the
continuous process of evaluating our needs with the occurrence of
each vacancy. Every time there is a vacancy, library-wide needs are
examined. Most of the time, new positions are created and then filled.
In examining the data in Appendix H, we can see the trend between FY97
and FY98 in the overall workyears for the library, reducing staff from 31.13 in FY97
to 28.59 in FY98.
The Computer Center data reflected in Appendix H shows labor savings of
$118,977 for FY97 and $307,146 for FY98. Dave Norman explained the FY97
results as follows, "some savings were realized by downsizing, some by
automation....! reduced my headcount by contracting out some services and by
automating some functions with equipment I could not have paid for without the
recaptured OPTAR."
When looking at the trend between the two years we can see that overall
staffing for the Computer Center is not decreasing (FY97 35.4 workyears and FY98
35.69 workyears). However, the distribution between the direct and reimbursable
has changed dramatically. In FY98, the Computer Center charged significantly
more labor to its reimbursable accounts than in the previous year (FY98
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reimbursable $641,718 compared to $137,639). Although the overall labor bill did
not decrease, the analysis of the data seems to reflect maneuvering between the
two pots of monies. Dave Norman claims to have been able reduce staffing
requirements in his interview. Looking back to the FY96 AP labor plan, we see that
in fact in FY96 Computer Center staff was at 38.5 workyears vice 35.4 workyears
executed in FY97.
In the case of the SM department, the data reflect that expenditures
exceeded their control number for both staff and faculty in both FY 97 and FY 98.
The discussion in this thesis would suppose that some of this was due to the
limitation put on SM that did not hamper the two Support departments. Reuben
Harris's comments were:
My expectations were that I would have the authority to establish
revised position descriptions, eliminate existing positions/billets,
create new billets, and change the nature of work responsibilities
among our staff from very narrow, inflexible responsibility
assignments, to very broad, increasingly challenging, and more
flexible assignments. I expected the new billets to generally be at
higher grades but that overall (over a period of time) I could
significantly increase staff productivity, capability, and job satisfaction
without increasing overall labor costs. I expected my role to be the
decision-maker as to changes in staff billet structure, reassignments
to new billets, which billets to revise or eliminate, and overall
leadership of the change within SM. More precisely, I expected to
eliminate some billets and people via attrition, eliminate the need for
other billets via work process change and use of technology, and
increase productivity via billet upgrades (skill and responsibility
increases), and gain increased utilization of staff time by cross-
training in multiple skills. I did not expect to reduce SM's total payroll
costs because at the time we were increasing the size of the faculty
and student body that was served by the staff. I did expect to reduce
the cost of staff per faculty/student served, and/or increase the value-
added service provided of staff per faculty/student served.
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It is difficult to compare the FY97 and FY98 data due to a functional transfer
of personnel and resources out of SM department in FY 98. However, the direct
teaching faculty average salaries did not show a perceptible shift toward lower paid
faculty in the classroom. This was one concern discussed in Chapter III. AP data
on planned versus executed EH for FY98 show 1021.8 planned EH (based on the
previous four quarters) and 1021.7 executed EH. The historical data used for the
initial allocation proved very consistent with the final execution information.
Workload discrepancies do not appear to have contributed to SM's over execution
of faculty direct teaching dollars. This implies that the overrun must reflect higher
than expected average salary and that SM did not substitute cheap labor for
expensive labor in the classroom. Looking at the data provided in Chapter III, page
16, we can see this by comparing the FY97 average direct cost of $105,796 to the
FY98 of $110,959. The increase is approximately 4.89%, when the pay raise
adjustment for FY 98 was only 2.9%. The pay raise adjustment does not include pay
step increases (also referred to as merit increases) for the faculty. This could
account for the higher rate of increase over pay raise but AP budgets for historical
average cost plus the pay raise factor only in the allocation process.
Given the comments by Reuben Harris, it is clear that he expected the ability
to restructure staff to be the focal point of his response to the currency change. The
restrictions of the delegation of classification authority prevented whatever plans he
intended.
Any plans to create faculty savings by consolidating classes would probably
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have been tempered by the disincentive of the faculty labor plan, discussed
previously, which would provide a short term savings but long term reduction the




Was the change in currency policy a success or did it fail? This is the
primary research question. Unfortunately, answering this question is not easy.
Different participants have different perceptions. Furthermore, many factors,
especially external factors like declining budgets, make the answer to this question
more than a simple yes or no.
B. WAS THE CURRENCY POLICY CHANGE SUCCESSFUL?
To address this question, consider the interview questions: Did you consider
the policy to be a success or not? What would you have changed?
These questions were asked of all of the stakeholders. Professor Whipple,
Associate Provost of Innovation contributed:
From what I understand transpired, there was no real change*. And I don't
know of anyone who was satisfied with the outcome. [Appendix B]
The superior stakeholders answered as follows:
Professor Dick Elster, Provost, Naval Postgraduate School:
Given the vicissitudes of budgetary life in DOD, I consider the
experiment somewhat successful. How did I reach that judgement?
I observed at least one manager acting to shave labor bills and move
the savings to purchase items needed by our students. Additionally,
at least one manager is very happy (she says) with the policy change.
I value that feedback. [Appendix A]
Professor Gil Howard, Academic Planning:
Yes, a success. Dollars are the unit of budgeting. Some argue that
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the incentive now is to put junior, or less qualified instructors in the
classroom. That may be so, but it is all we can afford. [Appendix C]
The subordinate primary stakeholders answered as follows:
Professor Rueben Harris, Systems Management Department Chairman:
I consider the experience to be a failure. . .The simple fact was that the
change was a failure because there was no change within SM. Thus
there was no basis for learning. I would suggest a very long list of
changes, too long to outline here. [Appendix D]
Layne Huseth, Reader Services Librarian:
I definitely consider the experiment a success. We were able to
create several new positions, classify them, and recruit applicants that
met our changing work needs. In addition, we were able to salvage
$100,000 of our labor budget for resource purchases that would have
otherwise been lost. The only thing I would change is the approval
process. If we have the authority to manage our payroll to budget,
then let us do that - as long as we stay within the regulations.
[Appendix E]
Finally, Professor Dave Norman, Director of Academic and Administrative
Computing Services (Code 05):
From my perspective, the experiment was a success. I wouldn't have
changed anything. [Appendix F]
One can see that the opinions ranged from unqualified success, to qualified
success, to failure. These differences of opinion can be better understood by
considering the following issues.
1. Who Were the Participants in the Initial Currency Policy Change?
SM, Library and Computer Center departments were the test departments
for the change in currency. AP, the Provost and key members of his staff were
involved in implementing the currency change. These represent the superior
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stakeholders involved in the experiment. The test departments are subordinate
stakeholders. The test departments themselves fall into two types; Academic (SM)
and support (Library and Computer Center) departments.
2. How Does the Labor Allocation Model Work and How Was It
Affected by the Policy Change?
There are two allocation models. The faculty labor allocation model is based
on the previous year's number of class sections taught and faculty average salary.
The staff model is a proration of remaining labor dollars based on longer-term
trends. The allocation methodology did not change with the currency change. The
change simply switched from workyears to dollar controls; the level of the controls
were calculated the same as before.
3. How Are the Incentives/Disincentives for Effective Labor
Management Affected by the Change in Budgetary Controls?
Departments have an incentive to reduce labor costs so they can keep the
savings. Academic departments have a disincentive to reduce faculty labor costs
because it detrimentally affects the future labor allocation. If the AP relies on
department labor savings to cover unanticipated mid-year shortfalls for other
departments, this is a further disincentive to the participants. Thrifty departments
are less motivated if the savings incentive is inconsistent. Departments that
overspend do not have an incentive to stop if their budget shortfalls are covered for
them, particularly if they potentially receive a higher budget the following year.
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4. What Goals Did Participants Expect from the Policy Change?
The responses to this question were varied. The Provost felt that the goai
was to decentralize and let managers manage. AP felt that the goal was to provide
incentives to departments to save labor funds. Professor Harris understood that the
goal to was to eventually generate surpluses within departments. Layne Huseth
stated that her goal was to manage her labor budget directly. Professor Norman
stated that he did not know what the goals were. Finally, Professor Whipple stated
that the goal was to provide incentives to at least slow DT (Direct Teach) growth,
if not actually save or reduce the DT budget.
5. Was There a Difference in the Perceptions of Success between
Superior and Subordinate Participants and between Academic and Support
Departments?
The superior stakeholders felt that the policy change was a success, albeit
a qualified one, based on the input from the subordinate stakeholders. The fact is
that two out of three subordinate stakeholders supported the change. This is
relevant when considering the strategic point of view held by the superior, or
"power" stakeholders. It is interesting to note that Professor Dave Whipple felt that
the policy change was a failure.
Perhaps the most telling point is that success, qualified success, and failure
fell along the lines of support and academic departments. The support
departments, Code 05 and the Library, felt the change was an overall success; the
academic department did not. This goes back to an earlier argument in this thesis:
the support and academic departments are fundamentally different entities in terms
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of labor allocation, as described in the labor allocation model in Chapter III. Any
comparisons across departments, or judgements about the overall success of the
currency policy change, must consider this fact.
Clearly the policy change interviews showed that the goals, incentives, and
disincentives were major issues in implementing the policy change. Clear goals
among all of the primary stakeholders are key to beginning a project or process
change. Without clear goals, the chance of overall success diminishes greatly.
Likewise incentives/disincentives should be made clear. If, as in this case,
incentives are inherent in a process but not explicitly stated, inconsistencies
between goals and incentives/disincentives can cause failure. The fact that the
currency policy change was never designed to be an "incentive plan" for managers
does not mean it will not work as a process change, if it implicitly changes
incentives. In any case, good two-way communication is vital to any project or
process and it was lacking in this case. Lack of communication in any process
inherently weakens that process. The currency policy change is no exception.
6. What Other Changes Related to Labor Management Might Better
Allow the Currency Policy Change to Increase Efficiency and Generate
Savings within the Departments?
Given the disparities between the accounting system and the labor plan
costing methods, the AP and Comptroller should coordinate the formulas. The AP
labor plan should adjust its leave distribution to mirror the accounting method.
Fringe could be handled statistically, as it is today, with an added contingency pool
for unexpected variances when the rate increases over time. Another option would
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be to keep the fringe as a central account for the School, if the benefit of tracking
through AP is not cost effective. The labor dollars for time worked and leave taken
could be decentralized to departments and tracked accurately using the AP labor
plan, with minor modifications to the current method.
Job classification authority is a potent tool to restructure the staff labor within
a department, given they have manage to payroll (MTP) authority. SM's faculty
labor allocation is driven by the requirement of classes that need to be taught.
There are few options, such as consolidating classes or putting lower paid faculty
in the classroom, that will meet this requirement and generate savings. This may
be detrimental to the students, because those instructors who are better qualified
to teach a particular class may cost more. The ability to restructure the staff
personnel (i.e., fewer high graded positions) would give an academic department
more flexibility.
Another issue to consider is the use of historical average salary to determine
faculty dollar control allocations. This introduces an element of uncertainty.
Historical data may not be the best standard to use if better information is available.
Labor plans are established in the June/July timeframe of the prior year, but class
scheduling and faculty planning also take place well in advance. Deans and
Department Chairs are already determining which classes are to be taught and by
whom. The fact that a lower paid lecturer was teaching a class in one year does not
mean that the next year's class scheduling will follow suit. The average salary for
faculty actually teaching classes may be different than the average AP uses in their
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control calculations. In part this reflects the variability of RR funding. Not only is the
amount of the department's RR variable over time, there is also variability in the
time per year that specific professors are covered by RR. This variability affects the
average faculty for DT. Average staff salary levels are more predictable, which
gives Code 05 and the Library an additional advantage over SM.
Finally, the main qualitative "lesson learned" focuses on communication.
Communication, or the lack thereof, has the capability to undo the best of plans, or
to make spontaneous business decisions work. In this case, perceptions, in part
due to poor communication, varied greatly about the goals and implementation of
the policy change. In fact, lack of communication is a major cause of failure in
incentive plans [Ref. 6]. However, it also clear that NPS relies on a labor allocation
model that varies substantially among departments. This had a great, if not the
most, impact on the outcome of the currency policy change.
C. OVERVIEW
The currency policy change, from its infancy, was never designed to be an
"experiment" with far reaching expectations. It was really a business decision, in the
course of many business decisions, to improve the overall business process. It was
implemented incrementally, beginning with SM, Code 05, and the Library. The
following year it was extended to the rest of NPS. Because it was not an
experiment, there was no feasibility study prior to its implementation, no analysis of
the first year results, and no associated incentive plan. The participants were not
selected randomly or strategically. Rather, the three participating departments were
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volunteers who saw a chance to improve their individual business processes and
benefit their respective departments.
Though the change in currency policy was never designed as an incentive
plan, it was "tested" on a trial group (the departments) before Schoolwide
implementation. This is commendable and in line with the way a new incentive plan
or process should be introduced. However, conventional incentive management
thought also indicates that the results of the plan, process, or policy change should
be analyzed prior to expanding it to an entire company, entity, or institution [Ref. 5].
This did not occur before expanding the currency change to all departments in
FY98.
This research also suggests several modifications that might help avoid
some of the problems that surfaced during this analysis. One alternative is to
stabilize the budget allocation and allow academic departments a longer period to
generate and recoup savings. Management could institute a three-year objective-
achievement system for the department chairs. Elements of this system would
include the objective, or dollar amount issued to a given department, the
department chair's forecast, and actual results that the department achieves.
Department labor allocations would be set for a three-year period, based on the
current labor allocation model. Departments would forecast labor objectives for
each year, with the objective focused on a department's specified labor savings by
the third year. Departments would keep any savings generated in the three years.
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Rewards could also be based on how well a department performs according
to its forecast year to year. Those departments that perform well, despite in-year
budget cuts, should be rewarded as well. The three-year point would allow
departments that performed well, relative to their forecasts, to keep some
percentage of savings; management could reinvest the remaining savings in
schoolwide issues.
A critical point in ensuring the success of this model is that management
protects the labor allocation from in-year cuts and other fluctuations that would
erode the trust between departments and management over the three years. This
may be done at the price of impacting other programs, such as deferring real
property maintenance program, academic infrastructure, cutting student textbook
allowance or reducing staff in other departments. Fencing the objective
achievement system may be unrealistic in totality. However a concerted effort by
management to protect the labor allocation and allow program managers to
generate labor savings would ensure "good citizen" behavior by all.
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APPENDIX A - INTERVIEW WITH DICK ELSTER, NPS PROVOST
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy* implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): The change in currency policy was motivated by a desire to put
financial decision-making into the hands of managers who had to execute programs
and meet payrolls. I wanted, for instance, the Librarian to have a total O&M, N
budget, and to be able to make tradeoffs between labor and book purchases, etc.,
without being constrained by ceiling points and labor dollar limits. So, in addition
to wanting to decentralize decision-making, I wanted to reduce the numbers of
constraints imposed on managers. Finally, I observed that the proportion of the
mission budget going to labor was going up, and the proportion to recapitalization
of labs and library was going down. I hoped that delegation would lead to some
migration of dollars from labor to recapitalization.
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: Goals were to decentralize, and let managers manage. The goals were no more
defined than that.
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
R: I became a participant because of frustrations with the multiple controls and
constraints put on Navy managers who are trying to deliver a program and live
within a volatile budget. I expected managers to be able to better manage their
programs, and feel better about their jobs. And I wanted to move dollars from labor
to "things."
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: The incentives for managers stemmed from the desire to do a good job, and to
have authority commensurate to their responsibility. Managers could, for instance,
"convert" labor dollars to "things." Disincentives (frustration and anger) developed
as unfulfilled resource expectation at the School level forced me to cut the dollars
I had promised managers they would have.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
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R: Given the vicissitudes of budgetary life in DOD, I consider the experiment
somewhat successful. How did I reach that judgement? I observed at least one
manager acting to shave labor bills and move the savings to purchase items
needed by our students. Additionally, at least one manager is very happy (she
says) with the policy change. I value that feedback.
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies
or downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: I believe some labor savings were realized. If we all believed we were going
to get the resources in the POM, I think we'd be more interested and better
participants in the effort to delegate.
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY 98?
R: The effort to change currency policy is absolutely in the right direction. As
mentioned above, the cynicism produced by budget drills makes most of us
skeptical about resourcing ideas, no matter how good those resources are. But we
should press on.
*Note: The "change in currency policy" terminology has replaced the "delegation
of authority experiment", as the nomenclature for the change from workyears to
dollars in FY 97. The term "experiment" is considered by many stakeholders,
and others, to be an inaccurate description of the event. No experiment, in the
formal sense, was ever conducted.
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APPENDIX B - INTERVIEW WITH DAVID WHIPPLE, ASSOCIATE
PROVOST FOR INNOVATION, NPS MONTEREY
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): The currency policy change was generated (originally) as a part of
NPS' "Reinvention" effort. The idea was that, when Chairs were given "work years",
they had the incentive to (1) use it all, and (2) to "allocate/spend" it on the most
expensive faculty. Thus I originally proposed that SM be given the "baseline
monetary ($) equivalent" of its FTE/work year labor budget, and be allowed to use
it most expeditiously, including using it for staff labor if warranted.
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: The goal was to see if there could be sufficient incentives provided to, at least,
slow the growth of DT, if not to actually "save'Vreduce the department DT budget.
One piece was to have been that if a department could save (i.e., not allocate)
some percentage of its budget, savings could be shared 50-50, an even split, and
over some period of time. That is to say the Mezzanine would not take that all of
the savings achieved by the departments. Nor would the departments' budget be
reduced the following year by the full saved amount!
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
R: By the time the change was activated, I was no longer SM chair, but as OAPI
(Office of the Associate Provost of Innovation) had volunteered to monitor and
measure the process, if requested.
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: Given the above, as I understand the way it was implemented, there was never
a mutual agreement on "the baseline" or a full resourcing to provide the intended
incentives.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
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R: From what I understand transpired, there was no real change] And I don't know
of anyone who was satisfied with the outcome.
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies or
downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: N/A
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY 98?
R: I don't know how/if it was implemented.
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APPENDIX C - INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR GIL HOWARD,
ACADEMIC PLANNING BOARD
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): At their weekly budget meeting the Division Deans discussed the
idea of moving away from "workyears" as the unit of currency in mission
budgeting. The idea was that Deans and Chairs needed to have an incentive
to save money. Under the work-year system each department was given a
certain number of faculty workyears for a fiscal year. If they spent it on (maybe
hired) an expensive individual or a less expensive individual it was all the same
to them. With a dollar budget they are given a fixed dollar amount and any
savings they make are available to them. Not all Deans wanted to make this
change so it was initially tried with only three departments (Library, code 05,
SM).
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: The goal was to provide incentive to departments to save labor funds. This
was clearly understood by the Deans and was soon evident to the departments.
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
R: As Director of Academic Planning I oversee the mission budget including
faculty and staff labor. I favored the change to dollars and still do. I expected
that departments would pay more attention to the actual labor costs than before.
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: The incentive was that, unless the budget was cut, the departments would be
able to keep any faculty labor savings for other uses. Likewise any shortfalls
would have to be made up from other sources (staff labor or OPTAR). This
change to dollars was also put in effect for staff labor.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
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R: Yes, a success. Dollars are the unit of budgeting. Some argue that the
incentive now is to put junior, or less qualified instructors in the classroom. That
may be so, but it is all we can afford.
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies or
downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: Certainly some savings were forced from downsizing, but probably some were
realized through paying more attention to the actual labor costs involved. We need
to be clear though that NPS does not have excess funds in the faculty (or staff)
budgets. We have cost shifted toward reimbursable - maybe too much.
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY 98?
R: The entire issue is mixed up with the voluntary decrease in labor to try to free
up funds for laboratories and the forced reduction imposed through the School's
budget. NPS has made severe reductions in direct labor in the last few years.
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APPENDIX D - INTERVIEW WITH REUBEN HARRIS, SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT CHAIRMAN
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): The currency policy change was never clearly defined nor widely
announced. However it was "understood" that Systems Management, along
with the Library and maybe a few other departments was to be given (delegated)
authority to manage itself within dollar-only controls/constraints except where
externally imposed regulation/law specified further constraints. The spirit of
"Reinvention of Government" and the real need to increase efficiency and apply
the most cost-effective procedures within NPS motivated the change. With Navy
revenues to NPS decreasing, status quo operations would not be affordable in
the future and new operating practices were needed. The change was seen as
a relatively low-cost-low risk way to identify and test what such an alternative
management approach could promise. Additionally, RADM Evans' willingness
to try new approaches, as well as Dave Whipple's willingness to push NPS as
a Navy Reinvention Lab, and a general lack of resistance to such an approach,
contributed support to the idea of the change.
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: The goals were never clearly articulated to me. Maybe they were clearly
stated within the NPS Planning Board or elsewhere, but they were not
communicated to the other departments or me. The Provost did say at least
once that he viewed the "change" as a way to see whether surpluses could be
generated within the departments, and if so how those surpluses would be
reinvested by the department Chair. I told the Provost and Dean Blandin that
I accepted that goal and looked forward to the challenge.
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
R: I was an aggressive volunteer for the program. My expectations were that I
would have the authority to establish revised position descriptions, eliminate existing
positions/billets, create new billets, and change the nature of work responsibilities
among our staff from very narrow, inflexible responsibility assignments, to very
broad, increasingly challenging, and more flexible assignments. I expected the new
billets to generally be at higher grades but that overall (over a period of time) I could
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significantly increase staff productivity, capability, and job satisfaction without
increasing overall labor costs. I expected my role to be the decision-maker as to
changes in staff billet structure, reassignments to new billets, which billets to revise
or eliminate, and overall leadership of the change within SM. More precisely, I
expected to eliminate some billets and people via attrition, eliminate the need for
other billets via work process change and use of technology, and increase
productivity via billet upgrades (skill and responsibility increases), and gain
increased utilization of staff time by cross-training in multiple skills I did not expect
to reduce SM's total payroll costs because at the time we were increasing the size
of the faculty and student body that was served by the staff. I did expect to reduce
the cost of staff per faculty/student served, and/or increase the value-added service
provided of staff per faculty/student served.
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: To my knowledge there were no incentives offered other than the implied
freedom and the expectation that I would get to keep my "savings" to be reinvested
in SM. The disincentives turned out to be much more prevalent-frustration resulting
from having no freedom to act and having all PD (Position Description) revisions
denied by 01 or 011.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
R: I consider the experience to be a failure. There was no change! I did receive a
letter from RADM Evans delegating labor delegation authority to me. Mary Aguilar,
Jim Blandin, and Bob Jay, agreed that SM had "manage to payroll authority." As
required, my key staff and I attended the required "Position Certification Course"
offered by OPM. However, when we attempted to use our "delegation authority" we
found that the old "chop chain" applying the same negative/cost controlling attitude.
The result was that no requested changes were approved, and all anticipated
changes were explicitly discouraged. I never received written notification or
explanation for 02/01 1 denials. The simple fact was that the change was a failure
because there was no change within SM. Thus there was no basis for learning. I
would suggest a very long list of changes, too long to outline here. The most
important change required was widespread and public top-down leadership from
start to finish. That did not seem to be present at any point!
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies or
downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: There were savings achieved during the year resulting from both process
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efficiencies and downsizing (e.g., the supply team innovation which reduced SM's
purchasing personnel hours and labor costs significantly). Similarly, we increased
cross training among our office-automation staff resulting in process efficiencies.
Finally, we increased our use of student staff to carry out basic clerical tasks
resulting in cost avoidance of hiring higher-grade full-time administrative staff (e.g.,
using GS-3 students instead of GS-5 full time staff). However, these
changes/innovations were accomplished outside of the failed policy change.
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY 98?
R: There are still potential " savings" available if we had the authority to act in ways
that could result in increased productivity, efficiency, and can-do spirit. I am
convinced that many of my staff is willing to give more if the "output and reward
transaction" is deemed fair. I deeply believe that management gets the work force
and the output that it deserves! We deserve less than we are getting in terms of
productivity, quality, efficiency, and motivation because we are not willing to change
the pay for those desired qualities. Significant improvement does not come free, but
it doesn't need to be expensive. We have to be willing to try new and different ways
of operating to get new and improved outcomes. So far we haven't been willing or
able to give such new ways a chance to prove they can pay off.
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APPENDIX E - INTERVIEW WITH LAYNE HUSETH, READER
SERVICES LIBRARIAN
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): The library director lobbied to obtain the authority, to manage payroll
to budget directly with the Provost. Approval was granted and both the
Administrative Librarian and the Library Director attended an OPM Classification
training course sponsored by HRO. Upon completion of this course, the Library
Director was authorized to approve the classification of new position descriptions
(subject of course to review and acceptance by HRO staff). In conjunction with this
authority, the library received labor budget figures from the Academic Planning
office for the first time (prior to this, we had access only to the number of billets that
were authorized with no actual $ data). The library examines each vacancy very
critically to determine if the position should be filled as it was originally described.
If changes are required or if new skills are needed, a new PD is written and
classified. The Director or Administrative Librarian discusses each action with
academic planning prior to processing the paperwork through the Personnel
system. Conscientious effort is made to balance the number of permanent FTE (full
time equivalents) with the number that is planned by Academic Planning to insure
maintenance of the overall NPS long term balance.
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: Goals of the experiment were not clearly defined. I think the Library had in mind
what and how to proceed. Our goals were to manage our labor budget directly. To
manage to the dollars provided, not to an artificial list of billets allowed on a piece
of paper maintained by Academic Planning. This goal was not completely realized
in that there was not a clear agreement between academic planning and the Library
as to what "Manage to Budget" entailed. By this, I mean that every time we wanted
to fill a position, we still had to go through Academic Planning and the tool/guideline
they used to approve or disapprove our action was the billet list that they
maintained. To obtain approval to exceed the number of staff authorized on the
Academic Planning Billet List was not simple. Frankly, I could never understand
why Academic Planning was in the approval if we had the authority to manage
payroll to budget.
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
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R: The Library Director requested authority from the Provost. My part in this
involved asking questions initially of the library director to identify what the
guidelines for filling vacancies was. As a supervisor, I wanted to know how much
latitude was possible in filling positions; and to do that I wanted to know how much
the budget was. For example, if I wanted to hire 2 technicians instead of a GS-1
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- could I do that? I thought that if I could show that the labor budget was not
negatively affected by this change, I should be allowed to do it. When I found out
that we didn't even know what our labor budget was - and also that this had
concerned the Director from the time that she had started working here (6 months
before) - the situation went on from there.
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: Incentives were more latitude in determining our determining our staffing needs
- we theoretically were not constrained by the "Billet List". A further incentive was
that dollars in the labor budget that were not spent on labor could be moved into
OPTAR and spent on resources. In the Library, our OPTAR budget has declined
at a time when the cost of resources (periodicals, serials, books, and electronic
tools like CD-ROM's and Internet access to databases) has increased at rates,
which range from 11% to almost 20% per year. Because we obtained the authority
to manage our labor budget in 1997, we were able to transfer $100,000 of excess
labor dollars from the labor budget to the OPTAR. Those funds made up for the
shortage in the budget and we did not have to cut subscriptions or significantly
reduce funds spent on books and electronic resources. The library had excess
labor dollars due to the difficulty we experienced in filling a number of unexpected
professional vacancies. Several of these were advertised nationally (in American
Libraries). It took a long time to obtain a pool of qualified applicants, to schedule
interviews and then select employees to fill those positions. The only disadvantage
I can think of is the difficulty in getting things through the Academic Planning
Office... this did get better.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
R: I definitely consider the experiment a success. We were able to create several
new positions, classify them, and recruit applicants that met our changing work
needs. In addition, we were able to salvage $100,000 of our labor budget for
resource purchases that would have otherwise been lost. The only thing I would
change is the approval process. If we have the authority to manage our payroll to
budget, then let us do that - as long as we stay within the regulations. It is
important to understand the personnel regulations very thoroughly and to follow
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them very carefully. Activities that are responsible for managing payroll to budget
must take this part of the job very seriously. They do not have latitude to do
"anything" they want with labor dollars or with the creation of positions... they do
need to understand and follow all of the regulations. I rather liked the challenge that
this represents. It is an interesting and creative process to achieve what is needed
within the organization (in our case, the library) and at the same time figure out how
to that within the restrictive rules and regulations we have to follow. You need to
understand the different options for filling positions - how delegated examining
authority works, how PPP (Priority Placement Program) affects hiring, how to
advantageously use term and temporary positions, and what the differences are for
excepted positions (VRA, handicapped, and SCEP - Student Career Employment
Program, and STEP - Student Temporary Employment Program). We are now
looking into hiring librarian interns; the creation of career ladder positions within the
library in several different series; intermittent status; and several other options which
give us some flexibility in managing our payroll.
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies or
downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: We have realized efficiencies and savings through the continuous process of
evaluating our needs with the occurrence of each vacancy. Every time there is a
vacancy, library-wide needs are examined. Most of the time, new positions are
created and then filled. The downside to this is that it takes time to complete the
process analysis each time a vacancy occurs, time to identify the best way to
proceed to fill the vacancy (in compliance with the regulations) and time to actually
recruit the person that we need. I anticipate even more success in these processes
in the future. The successes are tied to the library's process of strategically
planning actions - including those involving staffing. There must be a link between
the planning process and management to budget as well as a commitment and
involvement of the library management staff to this process. We are developing
strong links for all of these.
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY 98?
R: I think you already have the gist of what I would offer here. However, I will
try to sum it up in a "few" sentences.
1. If departments are going to manage payroll to budget, several
things need to change:
a. Departments need to be trained and held responsible for
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following personnel regulations. This will prevent frustration. I think the library
effort was successful because of this. We didn't try to make the system do what
we wanted it to without regard to the rules that must be followed. This is not
easy process, but it is possible.
b. We need to identify a different way to balance what
Academic Planning is responsible for (in terms of long range impact of additional
permanent positions) than the Billet System. It will continue to frustrate
departments if every time they go to Academic Planning with a proposal to
change their staffing, they continue to be told "you only have so many billets,
you can't do that". We need to change our language here to one of billets to one
of dollars. If the department can justify positions based upon budget and
demonstrate to Academic Planning's satisfaction that there will not be a negative
impact long term on NPS as a whole, then the department should be allowed to
proceed.
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APPENDIX F - INTERVIEW WITH PROF. DAVID NORMAN,
DIRECTOR OF ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPUTING
SERVICES
Question (Q) 1: Explain the change in currency policy implemented in FY 97.
What factors prompted the change?
Response (R): Not Applicable
Q2: What were the goals of the policy change? Were they clearly defined?
R: Never to me
Q3: How did you become a participant in the currency policy change? Explain your
role and expectations.
R: Harrison Shull (former NPS Provost) told me one day that we were now manage-
to-payroll. End of story.
Q4: What were the incentives or disincentives during the implementation of the
policy change?
R: The incentives were that we could recapture OPTAR by making better use of
billets. This worked! I reduced my headcount by contracting out some services and
by automating some functions with equipment I could not have paid for without the
recaptured OPTAR.
Q5: Did you consider the policy change to be a success or not? Please clarify.
What would you have changed?
R: From my perspective, the experiment was a success. I wouldn't have changed
anything.
Q6: If you realized savings, were these achieved through process efficiencies or
downsizing? If you did not, why not?
R: Both. Some savings were realized by downsizing, some by automation.
Q7: General comments about the currency policy change and its Schoolwide
implementation in FY98?
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R: There is no hope until managers and Dept. Chairs are held accountable for
busting their labor controls. The annual trial of taxing those who manage their
payroll in a professional fashion to cover the budget busters paints a very sad
picture.
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APPENDIX G - BUDGETARY CONTROLS
Switching from workyear to dollar controls allows departments to reprogram
labor savings for other purposes. However, as budgetary responsibility is
decentralized to the departments, it increases the importance of accurate budgetary
controls and tracking tools. If AP retains oversight and control over the
departments' budget performance, AP and the comptroller can resolve
discrepancies between AP's budgetary calculations and the official accounting
system. This was the procedure when AP used workyear budget controls. If
budgetary oversight and control is decentralized to the division Deans or
departments, it becomes increasingly hard to resolve budgetary discrepancies
between AP's labor plan and the official accounting system. If divisions or
departments exceed their actual budget limits due to accounting discrepancies,
there can be legal implications for the school as a whole.
The calculation for labor costs involves accrual accounting and utilizing
statistical accounts for leave and fringe costs. Statistical accounts for leave and
fringe benefits are established to recoup the reimbursable labor portion of these
costs. Leave and fringe costs always charge against the direct operating budget.
For every reimbursable hour worked, there is an additional charge levied for the
percentage of leave and fringe cost estimated to be charged against the direct at
some point during the year. [Ref. 4]. Therefore, if an employee is hired solely to
work on reimbursable projects, every hour worked would have the added cost of
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both the acceleration to offset any paid leave taken during the year and the
expected cost of benefits (e.g. retirement, health, etc.).
The acceleration rate is set at 17.2% for leave and 25.8% for fringe benefits,
for a total statistical acceleration rate of 43% in the official accounting system. All
productive time (direct and reimbursable labor) is accelerated with the preset rates
for both leave and fringe. Reimbursable costs are always charged at this statistical
rate, regardless of the actual leave and fringe costs. Therefore, reimbursable costs
= H x R x 1 .43, where H is the reimbursable hours worked and R is the hourly rate.
The direct operating budget (i.e., direct labor) provides the buffer for the actual
leave and fringe costs compared to the statistical rate. Discrepancies between
statistical and actual leave and fringe benefits are charged to direct labor. For
example, if the actual leave is higher than 17.2%, then the direct budget will be
charged the additional cost; if lower, the direct budget earns the credit. After this
adjustment, direct labor may be effectively accelerated above or below 43%.
The AP labor plan accounts for fringe benefits and leave costs differently
(see Labor Cost Calculation chart below). Fringe benefits costs are estimated using
historical statistical rates, but these rates are based on productive time and leave,
as opposed to simply productive time as in the accounting system, and there is no
adjustment for actual leave taken. Specifically, AP's fringe acceleration rates are
21% for faculty and 23% for staff (vice 25.8% for both faculty and staff in the
accounting system). Regarding leave, AP calculates total leave costs as actual
leave costs plus the fringe acceleration for leave. This total leave is prorated to both
68
direct and reimbursable labor according to their respective weights in total
unaccelerated labor costs. These accounting differences can cause discrepancies
between AP and the official accounting system.
The difference in the two calculations for fringe can cause discrepancies
because AP includes an added variable in the calculations, leave, which can
fluctuate and distort the equation's outcome. To illustrate these discrepancies,
consider the SM Staff labor delta for FY 97. See Labor Cost Calculation chart, page
78. AP includes a fringe acceleration for SM staffs leave cost. This creates a
$19,777.72 leave charge; the accounting system does not accelerate leave.
Furthermore, the two leave calculations use different accelerators: 23% of direct
and reimbursable labor for AP, 25.8% of direct and reimbursable labor for the
accounting method. Thus, the total leave acceleration is $105,767.80 for AP and
$81,330.75 for the official accounting system. AP prorates the total leave
acceleration to direct and reimbursable labor based on their respective percentages
of total productive labor (direct plus reimbursable labor), but does not adjust these
totals for actual experience. The accounting method accelerates both direct and
reimbursable labor for leave (17.2%) and adjusts the initial accelerated amount for
actual experience, creating a $4,659.34 leave adjustment against direct labor in
FY97. As a result, AP's total leave allowance is $105,767.80; the official accounting
system includes a net $85,990.08 leave allowance, an amount equal to actual
experience.
To illustrate the possible effects of this difference, consider a case where a
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SM Staff employee takes paid leave (e.g. sick, annual, holiday, etc.) for a week.
AP's labor plan leave acceleration allowance would be unaffected; it would remain
1 .23 time the total payment for direct, reimbursable and leave hours in all cases.
The cost in the accounting system would be adjusted for actual experience, with
the discrepancy between the initial allowance and actual experience charged
against direct labor.
Fringe adjustments can also cause discrepancies between AP's labor plan
and the accounting system. AP accelerates direct and reimbursable labor costs by
23% for staff and 21 % for faculty. AP also accelerates leave as described above.
The accounting system includes a 25.8% leave accelerator for direct and
reimbursable labor costs for both faculty and staff. Again, the fringe acceleration
is adjusted for actual fringe costs in the accounting system, creating a $12,073.88
charge against direct labor in FY97. The fringe accelerator is not adjusted for actual
experience in AP's labor plan.
As a result of the differences in leave and fringe acceleration calculations for
SM staff labor in FY97, AP understates direct SM staff costs by $13,158.12 and
overstates reimbursable staff labor costs by $7,622.06. Using the actual FY97 time
and labor data from the NPS Electronic Time and Attendance Certification System
(ETAC) for the three departments, the two methodologies have an outcome
variance between 0.1% to as much as 5.9% for calculating direct costs. In the
macro sum of mission labor the AP coordinates the overall labor, fringe and leave
calculations with the Comptroller's Office. These discrepancies can be significant
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FY 1997 COMPUTER CENTER STAFF cost ($)
Labor plan method
direct reimb leave frinqe total














1,471,448.33 386,347.35 N/A N/A 1,857,795.68
Accounting method
Basic cost(actual) 988,074.01 259,431.34 262,897.64 330,015.00 1,840,417.99
Fringe acceleration
(25.8%)


























Table 2. FY 1997 Computer Center Staff Cost.
73
FY 1997 LIBRARY STAFF cost ($)
Labor plan method
direct reimb leave frinqe total














1,086,349.30 184,334.11 N/A N/A 1,270,683.41
Accounting method






























Table 3. FY 1997 Libra
74
ry Staff Cost.




reimb leave frinqe total















219,470.15 467,907.03 N/A N/A 687,377.18
Accounting method


























232,628.27 460,284.97 N/A N/A 692,913.24
Delta from labor -13,158.12 $7,622.06 -5,536.05
plan method
Table 4. FY 1997 SM Staff Cost.
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FY 1997 SM faculty cost ($)
Labor plan method
direct Reimb leave frinqe total
















3,667,346.51 2,000,658.70 N/A N/A 5,668,005.21
Accounting method



























3,700,537.83 2,099,455.99 N/A N/A 5,799,993.82
Delta from Labor -$33,191.32 -$98,797.29 -$131,988.61
Plan Method
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